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Sources: Net ceilings = ‘gross amounts minus
(modulation and transfers, as well as cotton and POSEI)’ - European
Commission - DG Agriculture and Rural Development (Unit I.1)
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Area = Potentially eligible area in 2008 - IACS
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Beneficiaries in FY 2008 – DG Agriculture and Rural
Development (2008 CATS Report)
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Updated: 8.10.2010
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These amounts correspond to
the gross ceilings foreseen in Reg. 73/2009 with phasing-in completed for
EU-12, including the transfers from the wine enveloppe and the silkworms,
after modulation and transfers in accordance with Decision 379/2009.
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This graph shows the issue
of different levels of direct payments between Member States.
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•The bars in blue show the average level of payment per hectare in each
Member State in 2016 if we keep the current situation or status quo (2016 is
considered to take into account the full phasing in of the new member
states). This is a calculation obtained by dividing the total amount of
direct payments by the agricultural utilized area in each MS. It provide us
with the average level of payment per hectare in each MS. The difference
between the MS reflect the historical references for the direct payments,
firstly introduced in the 1992 reform, to compensate price reductions, and
calculated in function of past production levels of each MS.
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•The black bars show the difference between the average direct payments
in old MS (262 EUR/ha) and new MS (182 EUR/ha)
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•The orange line shows the level in which the EU flat rate (calculated
by dividing the total amount of direct payments in the EU by the total amount
of agricultural utilised area) all the amount would be set up to (with 100%
of current overall budget). The MS with high levels of aid would lose (left) and the MS with
low levels would win (right).
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•The bullets show an alternative calculation: average payments per
beneficiary instead of hectare (it is not actually the hectares who get the
money…). The case of Greece, that passes from the highest level of aid per
hectare to one of the lowest per
beneficiary, or Chec Republic in a opposite manner, shows how the payment
level discussion can have different angles.
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•One could as well see other alternative conclusions: the average
payments divided by the level of the country GDP. Here New Member states,
like Latvia would have a higher level of aid…
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Impacts of levelling direct
payments:
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•In short, the levelling of direct payments across the EU can lead to
important budgetary redistribution between Member States and regions. The
extreme would be to introduce a EU wide flat rate across the EU, leading to
big losers and winners.
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•This redistribution as important implications, beyond the budgetary
ones:
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•It would lead to a big impact in land values: in the MS loosing, land
values would be depressed while in the winning MS they would be inflated
(with negative effects, in particular, in “loosing” MS where the debt to
equity ratio of farms are already high);
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•There would big impact in farmer’s incomes. However, not necessarily
in terms of distribution of support between farmers (as flat rate direct
payments do not fundamentally affect the distribution of support between
farms) because with a flat rate this is largely determined by the unequal
distribution of land.
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